A legislative warning from the Hagamos parliamentary group has brought renewed urgency to Jalisco’s stalled judicial reform process. The group is pressing the state congress to approve a constitutional amendment that would bring Jalisco’s judicial selection process in line with Article 116 of the federal constitution. That article mandates that state judges be elected through direct, secret, and public vote—a requirement not yet reflected in Jalisco’s legal framework.
The stakes are high. If the reform is not approved by March 27, the state risks entering its next electoral cycle with a judicial structure that may be constitutionally noncompliant. Compounding the pressure, Jalisco’s constitution prohibits reintroducing a rejected constitutional amendment for six months. This means that failure to pass the reform before the deadline could delay compliance until after the electoral freeze period, which begins 90 days before elections. The result could be a governance vacuum in the judiciary and potential legal challenges to its rulings.
Hagamos legislators argue that this is not a discretionary policy choice but a binding constitutional obligation. They warn that without reform, judicial decisions could be contested on grounds of illegitimacy, undermining legal certainty and institutional continuity. The group has also emphasized that secondary legislation must follow by May 29 to fully operationalize the changes—another tight deadline within an already compressed legislative calendar.
Delay could render Jalisco’s judiciary structurally unconstitutional during its next electoral cycle.
The urgency reflects broader tensions within Mexico’s federal system, where state-level reforms must navigate both local political dynamics and overarching constitutional mandates. While Article 116 sets a clear standard for judicial elections, some legal scholars question whether its provisions apply uniformly across all states or whether implementation can vary based on local constitutional interpretation.
Opposition voices have raised concerns about the pace of deliberation. Critics argue that rushing such a fundamental change risks bypassing necessary public consultation and legislative scrutiny. They point to the limited precedent for judicial elections in Mexico as a reason for caution, noting potential risks of politicizing the judiciary in a system where judicial independence remains fragile.
Nonetheless, proponents maintain that delay carries greater risks than action. The possibility that judicial rulings could be invalidated due to procedural noncompliance introduces significant uncertainty into Jalisco’s legal system. In this view, timely reform is not merely desirable but essential to uphold rule-of-law standards and ensure institutional functionality during and after upcoming elections.
Whether consensus can be reached in time remains uncertain. The legislative calendar leaves little room for negotiation or revision. If the current proposal is rejected or allowed to lapse, Jalisco could face a prolonged period without a constitutionally valid mechanism for appointing judges—an outcome with far-reaching implications for justice administration in the state.
