When Morena rose to power in 2018 under the banner of the ‘Fourth Transformation’ (4T), it did so on a wave of public frustration with entrenched corruption. The party’s founder, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, promised to uproot what he called the greatest scourge of Mexican political life. Seven years later, that promise is under strain. Recent polling shows that public confidence in the government’s anti-corruption efforts has reached a new low.
According to a November 2024 national survey by El Financiero, 80% of respondents believe President Claudia Sheinbaum is not effectively combating corruption. Only 12% expressed approval of her performance on this front. Clara Brugada, head of Mexico City’s government and a prominent Morena figure, fared similarly poorly: 83% of those surveyed said she was failing to address corruption.
These numbers reflect more than just political dissatisfaction—they point to a growing perception that Morena has not only failed to deliver on its anti-corruption agenda but may have contributed to institutional backsliding. Since taking office, the party has dismantled or weakened several oversight bodies designed to ensure transparency and accountability. Critics argue that these moves have replaced institutional checks with political loyalty, undermining the very mechanisms needed to combat graft.
The gap between rhetoric and reality is widening—the administration’s moral authority is eroding.
“The gap between rhetoric and reality is widening,” said one observer. “The administration’s moral authority is eroding.”
Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index placed Mexico at 140th out of 180 countries—its worst ranking to date—with a score of just 26 out of 100. This places Mexico near the bottom among major global economies, ahead only of Russia within the G20.
Allegations have also surfaced involving opaque public contracts awarded without competitive bidding, often to newly created firms with political connections. Some reports have pointed to the misuse of social programmes for electoral purposes and accusations implicating close associates and family members of former president López Obrador.
Morena officials have dismissed many of these criticisms as politically motivated attacks from conservative opponents. They argue that the administration’s social welfare policies and redistribution efforts represent meaningful progress for millions of Mexicans. Isolated prosecutions are occasionally cited as evidence that accountability remains a priority.
Yet for many citizens, such arguments no longer suffice. The same El Financiero polling shows a steady decline in approval over time. In March 2024, 60% disapproved of Sheinbaum’s anti-corruption efforts; by July it was 66%, and by November it had jumped to 80%. Brugada’s numbers followed a similar trajectory.
The erosion of public trust may carry long-term consequences for Morena’s political project. The party once positioned itself as a moral alternative to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and National Action Party (PAN), whose reputations were tarnished by decades of corruption scandals. Now, with mounting perceptions of impunity and institutional decay, Morena risks becoming associated with the very practices it vowed to eliminate.
As Mexico approaches future electoral cycles, the persistence of corruption—and the perception that it goes unpunished—may test Morena’s ability to maintain broad public support. The challenge is no longer just about prosecuting wrongdoing; it is about restoring credibility in the institutions meant to prevent it.
